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Highlights
• There were fears in the European Union that eastern
enlargement would lead to major job losses and transfers.
More recently, these fears have extended to high-skilled and
IT jobs. This paper examines using unique firm-level data if
these fears are justified for Austria and Germany.
• We find that eastern enlargement has led to job losses of
less than 0.5 percent of total employment in Germany and
of 1.5 percent in Austria. Low-cost jobs in affiliates in
eastern Europe help Austrian and German firms stay
competitive in an increasingly competitive environment.
However, we also find that multinational firms in Austria and
Germany are outsourcing skill-intensive activities to
eastern Europe, taking advantage of cheap and abundant
skilled labour there. This is a response to a human capital
scarcity in Austria and Germany, which became particularly
severe in the 1990s.
• We find a reverse pattern of ‘maquiladoras’ (a phenomenon
seen in the United States and Mexico) between Austria and
Germany and their eastern neighbours. Skilled workers in
Austria and Germany are losing out from outsourcing. In
both countries, outsourcing contributes 35 percent and 41
percent, respectively, to changes in relative wages for
skilled workers in Austria and Germany. To address the skill
exodus to eastern Europe, we suggest liberalising the
movement of high-skilled workers.
* Bruegel and the University of Munich.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Many people in the European Union fear that eastern enlargement has led to major job 
losses in 'old' member states, particularly in Austria and Germany, as the two most im-
portant neighbours of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. More recently, 
in Germany, these fears about job losses to the accession countries have extended to 
high-skilled labour and IT jobs. German firms are seen to outsource the skill-intensive 
stages of production to eastern Europe leading to an exodus of firms and high-skilled 
jobs to eastern Europe. Are these fears justified? 
 
To address these questions, this paper makes use of new survey data of 660 German and 
Austrian firms with 2,200 investment projects in eastern Europe during the period 1990-
2001. The new survey data represent 100 percent of Austrian and 80 percent of German 
direct investment in eastern Europe. 
 
This paper discusses three issues. First, I examine if eastern Europe has become a new 
member in the new international division of labour that has characterised the world 
economy in the last two decades. Is eastern Europe becoming an important location for 
firms’ international organisation of production (section 4)? Then I examine if an exodus 
of jobs to eastern Europe has in fact taken place. Has eastern enlargement encouraged 
the relocation of firms to eastern Europe substituting cheap east European workers for 
costly German or Austrian workers (section5)? Third, I look at if it is indeed the case 
that high-skilled jobs are moving to the east as is repeatedly argued in the press in Ger-
many (section 6). Is a reverse pattern of ‘maquiladoras’ emerging after eastern enlarge-
ment (section7)?. Lastly, I discuss some of the proposals to address the problem of 
firms’ outsourcing high-skilled labour. In particular, I show that subsidising research 
and development activity in Germany or Austria to prevent the  exodus of high-skilled 
jobs to eastern Europe will exacerbate the problem. I then suggest immediate liberalisa-
tion of the movement of skilled workers from eastern Europe to address the human 
capital crisis in Germany and Austria.  
 
   
2.  Trade and investment integration with eastern Europe 
 
Since the fall of Communism, trade integration with eastern Europe has taken place at a 
fast pace in both Austria and Germany. In 2006, 14.7 percent of Germany’s and 20.6 
1 
 percent of Austria’s exports  went to eastern Europe and the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States), and 15 percent of both countries' imports  came from this region.  
 
1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006 1990 2001 2006
in percent
 1
CEE 5.0 12.2 12.8 2.5 9.7 9.6 3.0 7.8 9.4 2.8 8.8 9.8
SEE 3.2 2.8 4.4 0.2 1.2 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.0
CIS 2.2 1.8 3.4 1.8 2.2 3.0 4.1 2.4 3.7 3.2 3.2 4.8
Total 10.4 16.8 20.6 6.8 13.1 15.1 8.9 11.2 14.7 7.7 12.7 15.6
Source: Statistik Austria, Statistisches Bundesamt
1 of total Austrian and German exports or imports, respectively
Export Share
Note: CEE includes Baltic States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Solvak Republic, and Slovenia; SEE includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia; and CIS includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Taijkistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Table 1.    Trade Integration with Eastern Europe
Austria
Import Share
Germany
Import Share Export Share
 
 
 
average average average average average average
1992-1994 2000-2002 2005-2007 2008 1992-1994 1999-2001 2005-2007 2008
FDI to EE in percent of total FDI 34.1 87.7 58.3 50.3 5.4 2.4 13.0 10.2
CEE 94.8 81.0 11.5 30.1 90.7 83.6 43.3 43.6
Czech Republic 29.0 16.7 12.1 10.3 32.8 18.1 8.4 15.0
Hungary 52.9 23.1 10.4 14.9 36.9 12.5 9.7 8.9
Poland 1.7 7.6 -18.6 3.0 16.7 27.9 21.0 12.5
Slovak Republic 5.2 24.3 4.7 -0.3 3.4 22.9 3.9 2.3
Slovenia 5.8 9.1 2.9 2.2 0.3 0.9 1.1 -0.1
Baltic States 0.1 0.2 - - 0.7 1.2 -0.8 4.9
SEE 4.1 12.2 69.7 32.7 3.1 16.0 15.5 12.6
Bulgaria 0.6 1.1 10.5 10.9 3.2 1.2 1.7 4.9
Croatia 2.9 8.0 15.1 7.8 1.0 12.0 1.7 1.1
Romania 0.5 3.2 36.6 9.4 0.5 3.1 9.7 4.9
CIS 0.5 6.2 18.8 37.2 4.0 7.4 41.3 43.8
Russia 0.5 5.3 12.5 14.7 2.7 7.0 26.6 32.8
Ukraine 0.0 0.8 6.2 22.5 1.3 0.4 14.5 10.6
Source: Austrian National Bank, German National Bank, and UNCTAD (2000).
1 in percent of total outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Eastern Europe
Germany 
Table 2.    Investment Integration with Eastern Europe
Outgoing FDI
1 Outgoing FDI
1
Austria 
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 During the 1990s, investment integration with eastern Europe was much more pro-
nounced than trade integration, in particular for Austria. Between 2000-2002 eastern 
Europe accounted for 88 percent of total outgoing investment in Austria, while the share 
of eastern Europe in Germany’s foreign investment was  two percent only. Thus, with 
the opening up of eastern Europe, Austria has concentrated almost all its outgoing in-
vestment on this region, while on a global scale eastern Europe is of little importance as 
a host region for Germany (see Table 2). Nevertheless, Germany and Austria are the 
most important investors in this region. Both countries account for around 50 percent of 
total incoming foreign investment in Croatia and Slovenia and for around 40 percent of 
total incoming investment in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (see Marin, 
Lorentowicz, Raubold, 2002). More recently, however, both countries expanded their 
investment activity in Russia and south eastern Europe (SEE) at the expense of central 
and eastern Europe (CEE). As a result, eastern Europe has become more important as a 
location for Germany (its share increased from 2.4 percent in 1999-2001 to 13 percent 
in 2005-2007) while less important for Austria (its share declined from 88 percent in 
2000-2002 to 58 percent in 2005-2007). 
 
 
3.  The data 
 
The firm-level survey of German and Austrian investors in eastern Europe was con-
ducted for the years 1997-2001 in Germany and 1999-2001 in Austria. The sample con-
sists of 2,200 investment projects by 660 Austrian and German firms from 1990-2001. 
In terms of value, the 1,200 German investment projects represent 80 percent of total 
German investment in eastern Europe, while the 1,000 Austrian investment projects 
represent 100 percent of total Austrian investment in eastern Europe. The data covers 
the period from 1990-2001, but the actual numbers are from the years 1997-2000 in 
Germany and 1999-2000 in Austria. 
 
Under Communism, no foreign direct investment in eastern Europe  took place due to a 
political ownership constraint. Thus, when we started the survey of German and Aus-
trian firms with investments in eastern Europe, we were in the unique situation of being 
able to collect detailed information on each foreign investment project in eastern Europe 
and at the same time to aim for a full population sample. The result is a data set that al-
lows us to say something representative about how foreign direct investment and out-
sourcing to eastern Europe affects the Austrian and German economies. At the same 
time, the data allows us to say something representative about how incoming foreign 
investment is affecting eastern Europe because Austria and Germany are such important 
investors in this region. 
 
The survey questionnaire was in three parts: information on parent firms in Austria and 
Germany, information on the actual investment project, and information on eastern Eu-
ropean affiliates and their environments. A parent firm may undertake more than one 
investment in eastern Europe. In the sample, Austrian investors had undertaken four to 
five investments and German investors two to three investments in eastern Europe on 
average. Due to the length of the questionnaire (we collected information on about 500 
variables) we personally visited the parent firms in Austria and Germany or conducted 
the interview by phone. Very few questionnaires were sent out by mail and filled out 
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 anonymously. The sample is unique in several respects. First, it includes detailed infor-
mation on parent firms in Austria and Germany, such as balance sheet data, the internal 
organisation of the multinational enterprise, its global network, the incentive system 
used for its workers, and power relationships between parents and affiliates. Second, it 
contains information about how and where the investment is financed. Third, it includes 
information on affiliates in eastern Europe, such as ownership structure, type of owner-
ship, financial structure, competitive environment, and parent and affiliate trade rela-
tions. The sample consists of quantitative as well as qualitative information.  
 
 
4.  A new participant in the global division of labour?  
 
Is eastern enlargement offering eastern Europe the prospect of becoming a new partici-
pant in the new international division of labour? If yes, what kind of firm activity is 
transferred to eastern Europe? In the last two decades the world economy has gone 
through a dramatic change. A new international division of labour is emerging in the 
world economy.  The global firm produces one input in one location which is then sent 
for refinement to a second location. The refined input is further refined at a third loca-
tion. Thus, firms geographically separate different production stages across the world to 
exploit differences in production costs
1. Take the example of the German firm Siemens. 
Like other global corporations, Siemens has organised its activities in a global value 
chain with its R&D and engineering activities located in Europe and the United States, 
procurement and logistics located in south east Asia, its assembly activity located in 
eastern Europe, and its marketing activities organised at local  level or via the Internet
2. 
Is this organisational pattern, a general trend among firms in Austria and Germany and 
is eastern Europe becoming an important location for these firms in their global organi-
sation of production?  
 
In other words, why do German and Austrian firms invest in eastern Europe ? Do they 
want to replicate their production facilities in the countries of  eastern Europe or do they 
want to exploit differences in factor costs between Germany and Austria on the one 
hand and eastern Europe on the other? The former is a horizontal foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and is primarily motivated to gain access to the host country market. The 
latter is a vertical FDI and is motivated by wage differentials
3. One reason why we 
might be interested to distinguish between these two forms of multinational activity is to 
identify their potential effects on wage inequality and employment levels in Austria and 
Germany.  
 
                                                           
1  The new features of globalisation are described in the 'Globalisation Report to the European Com-
mission', see Bourguignon et al (2002). 
2 See  Financial Times Deutschland , 12 December 2003, and Sorg, Armin (2001) Erwartungen und 
Erfahrungen eines Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen 
einer EU-Osterweiterung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn. 
3  For the theory of vertical FDI, see Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985); for theories of 
horizontal FDI, see Brainard (1993, 1997), Markusen and Venables (2000). 
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 Figure 1. Comparative advantage of eastern Europe 
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Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw); Statistisches Bundesamt; Statistik Austria; Chair of International Economics, 
University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
1) outsourcing: average wage (wage bill per employee) in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
offshoring: average wage (wage bill per employee) of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for 
Austria in 1999-2000 and for Germany in 1997-2000
2) outsourcing: GDP per employment in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001.
offshoring: sales per employee of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000 and 
for Germany in 1997-2000
3) outsourcing: wage bill divided by GDP in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
offshoring: wage bill divided by sales of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-
2000 and for Germany in 1997-2000
CEE includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary; SEE includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Romania; CIS includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus
1) 1)
2) 2)
3) 3)
 
 
When multinational firms wish to exploit differences in factor costs in eastern Europe 
how much in terms of labour costs can they save when establishing an affiliate in east-
ern Europe? In Figure 1, we compare relative wages, relative productivity, and relative 
unit labour costs between Austria and Germany on the one hand and central eastern Eu-
rope (CEE), southern eastern Europe (SEE), and the countries of the former Soviet Un-
ion (CIS) on the other. We focus first on Germany. It appears from the left panel of Fig-
ure 1 that wages in CEE are about 23 percent of those in Germany, while productivity in 
these countries has reached about 23 percent of Germany’s productivity level. As a re-
sult, labour unit costs in CEE countries are the same as in Germany. Thus, when Ger-
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 man firms buy input goods in one of the CEE countries they do not save on costs for the 
input good compared to when the input is produced in Germany.  
 
Can these costs be reduced when multinational firms open an affiliate in one of the CEE 
countries and produce the input themselves? Figure 1 reveals that German affiliates in 
CEE pay 16.5 percent of their German parent wages but are increasing their productivi-
ty to 60 percent of the parents’ productivity level. Therefore, they can reduce the labour 
costs by 72.4 percent relative to their parent firms’ cost in Germany.  
 
In the SEE countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) both wages and productivity are low 
so that unit labour costs in the SEE countries are 91 percent of Germany’s unit labour 
costs. Furthermore, these costs are not reduced by as much as in the CEE countries 
when German firms produce locally in the SEE countries (labour cost are reduced by 50 
percent), since producing locally does not help to increase productivity as much as in 
the CEE countries. 
 
The picture looks different in the CIS countries. Relative wages in Russia and Ukraine 
are five percent of Germany’s, while these countries have eight percent of Germany’s 
productivity, so that their unit labour costs are 67 percent of Germany’s. However, 
when German firms produce locally in affiliates in the CIS they can save 73 percent of 
their labour costs due to lower wages of German affiliates in Russia and Ukraine.  
 
The right panel of Figure 1 gives similar numbers for Austria.  
 
But how important are each of these motivations – market seeking versus cost-
advantage seeking – for foreign direct investments in eastern Europe? Are German and 
Austrian firms primarily moving their activities to eastern Europe to exploit differences 
in factor prices or do they want to be close to the eastern European market by producing 
locally?  
 
One way to answer this question is to look at the pattern of intra-firm trade. In Table 3, I 
use the pattern of intra-firm trade as a criterion to determine whether German and Aus-
trian foreign investments in eastern Europe are market seeking or cost advantage seek-
ing. I define foreign investment in eastern Europe as a multinational outsourcing activi-
ty driven to exploit differences in factor prices when parent firms in Austria and Ger-
many export input goods to their affiliates in eastern Europe as well as import these 
goods back from their affiliates in eastern Europe after refinement. Thus, in an out-
sourcing activity, affiliates in eastern Europe do not produce exclusively for the local 
market. This way, multinational outsourcing involves an intra-firm export from the par-
ent firm in Germany or Austria to their affiliates in eastern Europe as well as an intra-
firm import from their affiliates in eastern Europe to Germany or Austria
4. 
                                                           
4  In the literature different definitions of outsourcing have been used. Hummels et al (2001) use input-
output tables at the industry level to calculate an index of vertical specialisation. Vertical specialisa-
tion is defined as the share of imported inputs which is re-exported. Hanson et al (2001) use the no-
tion of export platforms to calculate the share of exports in percent of affiliates’ output of US multi-
nationals.  The criterion for outsourcing used here is somewhat more strict than those in the literature. 
It is more strict than Hummels et al’s measure of vertical specialisation, since I include intra-firm in-
puts only, while Hummels et al include inputs also between independent firms. It is also more strict 
than Hanson et al’s concept of export platforms, since I require an import as well as an export be-
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I focus first on Germany. From the right panel of Table 3 we see that on average 45 per-
cent of all German investment to eastern Europe fulfills these criteria and is motivated 
by lower wages in eastern Europe. The importance of outsourcing investment becomes, 
however, much greater for individual eastern European countries. Outsourcing domi-
nates among German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Roma-
nia (share of around 70 percent). It plays little role in Slovenia and Poland. When a tigh-
ter criterion for outsourcing is used, requiring that parent firms import at least 20 per-
cent of their eastern European affiliates’ output rather than import at all, German multi-
nationals' outsourcing is reduced to 10 percent in the Czech Republic, to seven  percent 
in Russia and to two  percent in Ukraine. All the other numbers remain the same.  
 
Among Austrian multinationals, the outsourcing activities to eastern Europe are much 
less significant. Only 17 percent of total Austrian investment to eastern Europe is moti-
vated by lower wages in eastern Europe. But again the share varies considerably across 
individual countries in eastern Europe. Sixty-eight percent of Austria’s investment in 
Russia and 42 percent of its investment in Poland is motivated by factor prices. These 
numbers do not change when a  stricter criteriion for outsourcing  is applied requiring 
parent firms to import at least 20 percent of their eastern European affiliates’ output.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tween parent and affiliates and I include exports of  affiliates to parent firms only, while Hanson et al 
include all exports of affiliates whatever their destination in their measure of export platforms. 
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 Baltic States 3 3.11 7 28.43
Czech Republic 36 11.73 77 75.95
Hungary 27 10.19 42 27.18
Poland 20 41.54 38 14.50
Slovak Republic 19 9.94 16 68.71
Slovenia 13 15.49 5 12.44
Bulgaria 4 2.99 9 71.94
Romania 14 24.20 19 63.68
other SEE 21 8.46 5 14.29
Russia 7 67.90 31 26.59
Ukraine 8 16.14 4 17.11
other CIS 3 3.72 24 49.36
2) of all foreign direct investments in respective Eastern European country.
1) parent firms export intermediate goods as well as import intermediate or final goods from their affiliates in Eastern Europe; A tighter 
criterion for outsourcing requiring that parent firms import at least 20 percent of their Eastern European affiliates' output (rather than 
import at all) reduces the German multinationals' outsourcing numbers for the Czech Republic to 10 percent, for Russia to 7 percent, and 
for Ukraine to 2 percent. All other numbers remain the same.
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
29.15
all transition countries 175 17.27 277 45.44
CIS 18 42.11 59
46.68
55.68 SEE 39 12.06 33
CEE 118 17.12 185
Table 3.    Multinationals' Outsourcing Activity to Eastern Europe 
1)
   Austrian Multinationals   German Multinationals
cases in percent 
2) cases in percent 
2)
 
 
 
In summary, the pattern of vertical specialisation that has emerged between Germany 
and eastern Europe on the one hand and Austria and eastern Europe on the other, sug-
gests that some of the eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
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 Romania and Russia, have clearly become new participants in the international division 
of labour. 
 
 
5.  An exodus of jobs? 
 
In the previous section we documented that German and Austrian firms can substantial-
ly reduce their labour costs (between 37-73 percent) by outsourcing to eastern Europe. 
We also showed that in Germany 45 percent, and in Austria 17 percent, of investments 
in eastern Europe are motivated by lower wages in eastern Europe, with firms outsourc-
ing labour-intensive production stages to eastern Europe. Does this imply that these out-
sourcing activities have caused major job losses in Germany and Austria, respectively? 
We first look at what firms themselves say they are doing and then turn to an econome-
tric analysis. 
 
 
5.1 What the firms say … 
 
In this section we make a back-of-the-envelope calculation of multinational job reloca-
tions to eastern Europe based on what multinational corporations say they are doing. In 
the firm survey, we asked firms to classify what motivated their investments in eastern 
Europe and whether or not the investment is a relocation of production to eastern Eu-
rope or the creation of additional capacity in eastern Europe beyond the capacity in 
Austria and Germany, respectively. The motivations considered are access to the eastern 
European market, market size, lower production costs, availability of well-trained 
skilled labour, and avoidance of transport costs and of exchange-rate risk. In addition 
firms gave us information on how many jobs each of their investments created in east-
ern Europe. A positive response to lower production costs and to offshore production in 
the survey together with the filled-in information on jobs in eastern Europe, is then used 
to compute the job losses associated with offshore production in Austria and Germany, 
respectively. 
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 Austria Germany Austria Germany
Relocation Induced Jobs 
due to:
offshore production -10,494 -115,698
low production costs -38,022 -117,074
intra-firm imports -57,833 -207,220
affiliate to parent productivity 0.61 0.56 0.77 0.43
Job Destruction -29,595 -130,352 -44,531 -89,105
Trade induced Jobs
due to:
induced exports to EE 7,157 36,606 2,951 53,607
induced imports from EE -4,901 -34,555 -5,433 -107,904
Job Creation 4,279 2,051 -2,482 -54,297
Net Job Destruction -25,316 -128,301 -47,013 -143,402
in percent of parent employment -1.72 -1.07 -3.19 -1.19
in percent of total employment -0.82 -0.38 -1.51 -0.42
Austria Germany
Total Affiliates Employment (survey) 201,795 463,550
Total Parent Employment 1,473,176 12,044,598
Total Employment  3,106,000 34,133,000
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
Notes:
offshore production: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when firms classified the investment as a relocation activity from Germany and 
Austria, respectively.
low production costs: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when investors ranked low production costs as decesive or important motivation for 
the investment.
affiliate to parent productivity: ratio of value added per employee in Eastern European affiliates to value added per employee in parent firms.
induced exports: number of jobs created in Austria and Germany, respectively, due to inputs delivered by parent firms to affiliates in EE. The value of inputs is 
divided by parent firms value added per worker to obtain the number of jobs created in Austria and Germany, respectively.
induced imports: number of jobs lost in Austria and Germany, respectively, due to intermediate and final goods sent by affiliates in Eastern Europe to parent 
firms. The value added of EE affiliates is divided by parent firms value added per worker to obtain the number of jobs lost in Austria and Germany, respectively.
intra-firm imports: number of jobs created in Eastern European affiliates, when parent firms in Germany and Austria import inputs from their affiliates in 
Eastern Europe.
subjective measure objective measure
number of jobs
Table 4.    Multinationals' Job Relocations to Eastern Europe
 
 
 
The calculation of job losses based on this ‘subjective measure’ is given in Table 4. 
German multinationals have created 463,550 jobs and Austrian multinationals 201,795 
jobs in eastern Europe. According to our calculation, these newly created jobs in eastern 
Europe have led to a direct loss of 128,301 jobs in Germany and 25,316 jobs in Austria 
due to multinationals relocating to eastern Europe. These figures are obtained by com-
puting the jobs created by German firms in eastern Europe when investors have given 
low costs or outsourcing as the prime motivation for the investment. From this motiva-
tion, German firms have created 232,772 jobs in eastern Europe, which accounts for 50 
percent of total German affiliates’ employment in eastern Europe. Note, however, that 
German affiliates in eastern Europe have on average 56 percent of the productivity level 
of their parent firms only. Therefore, one job created in eastern Europe is equivalent to a 
0.56 job lost in Germany implying relocation-induced job destruction of 130,352 jobs in 
Germany. 
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 But the opening of a subsidiary in eastern Europe creates new trading opportunities. 
German parent firms typically deliver inputs for further refinement to their affiliates in 
eastern Europe. These intra-firm exports to eastern Europe  have createds 36,606 jobs in 
Germany. The number is obtained by computing the number of jobs created in Germany 
due to inputs delivered by parent firms to affiliates in eastern Europe. To compute the 
number of jobs created in Germany, we divide the value of inputs sent to affiliates in 
eastern Europe by the parents’ value added per worker. Thus, 36,606 workers in Ger-
many were used to produce the value of inputs sent to eastern European affiliates. 
 
Eastern European affiliates, in turn, deliver refined inputs or final goods back to parent 
companies. These intra-firm imports from eastern Europe  resulted in 34,555 jobs lost in 
Germany. Again, this number is obtained by computing the number of jobs lost in Ger-
many due to eastern European  affiliates’ delivery of goods to parent firms in Germany. 
The value added of eastern European affiliates is divided by parent firms’ value added 
per worker. Thus, 34,555 workers are not used in German production, because the value 
added is produced by eastern European affiliates. The described intra-firm exports and 
imports lead to net trade-induced job creation of 2,051 jobs. This adds up to a net de-
struction of 128,301 jobs in Germany. 
 
An analogous computation results in a net destruction of 25,316 jobs in Austria. It is 
interesting to note that Austrian firms create 48,516 jobs in eastern Europe because of a 
cost saving motivation, which accounts for 24 percent of total Austrian affiliates' em-
ployment in eastern Europe. This is half as much as in Germany, where 50 percent of 
affiliates’ jobs in eastern Europe are created because of cost considerations
5. Taking the 
productivity differential between parent and affiliates and intra-firm trade into account, 
the job creation in eastern Europe translates into a loss of 25,316 jobs in Austria. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 gives an analogous calculation of job losses based on an ‘objec-
tive measure’ rather than on the relocation motive given by firms. In the ‘objective 
measure’ for an outsourcing investment we require that parent firms in Austria and 
Germany import input goods from their affiliates in eastern Europe. Here we find that 
207,220 jobs have been created in eastern Europe by German firms, which results in 
destruction of  89,105 jobs, which leads to a net destruction of 143,402 jobs in Germany 
because the trade induced job losses are much larger by this measure of outsourcing. 
The calculation based on the ‘objective measure’ gives job losses of 47,013 in Austria. 
 
The computation in Table 4 is a rough calculation and has to be taken for what it is. 
Thus, the computed job numbers have to be interpreted with caution. In particular, the 
calculation has the following shortcomings. The calculation assumes that one job lost at 
the level of the firm translates into one job lost to the economy as a whole. Thus, the 
computation ignores any general equilibrium effects. Typically, when workers lose their 
jobs at one particular firm, they are reemployed by other firms with an accompanying 
                                                           
5  This is consistent with the findings of the previous section that outsourcing activities dominate 
among German investment, but not among Austrian investment in eastern Europe. One reason for 
this difference between Germany and Austria is the different pattern of specialisation of German and 
Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. Germany is predominantly engaged in machinery and trans-
port with 90 percent of outsourcing investment, while Austria is predominantly involved in banking 
with 30 percent of outsourcing investment. 
11 
 adjustment in wages. Ignoring such general equilibrium effects may be justified when 
wages are not allowed to adjust due to labour market rigidities. Figure 2 of section 7 
shows that relative wages remained more or less fixed in Austria and Germany during 
the 1990s, suggesting that these general equilibrium effects could not fully work them-
selves through the system. Thus, applying the one-to-one assumption does not seem to 
be completely unrealistic for Austria and Germany. In any case, the computation leads 
to larger job losses in Germany and Austria, respectively, than would have taken place 
otherwise with flexible wages when general equilibrium effects are taken into account, 
and thus can be seen to represent an upper bound of the true job losses due to outsourc-
ing. 
 
The computed losses of 128,301 (143,402) jobs in Germany and of 25,316 (47,013) jobs 
in Austria account for about 0.4 percent and 0.8 percent of total employment in Germa-
ny and Austria, respectively, with the subjective measure of outsourcing, and of 0.4 and 
1.5 percent in Germany and Austria with the objective measure of outsourcing. These 
are indeed small numbers.   
 
Why are these job losses surprisingly so low? To get to an answer we turn now to an 
econometric analysis of the labour demand of multinationals.  
 
 
5.2 An econometric analysis 
 
In this section, I examine by estimating labour demand functions of German and Aus-
trian parent firms if and how multinationals’ labour demand across locations is related. 
Does  a multinational firm in Austria or Germany reduce labour demand in the Austrian 
or German labour market when wages in its affiliates in eastern Europe decline? In this 
case, cheaper labour in eastern Europe substitutes for expensive labour in Austria and 
Germany. 
 
Consider a firm producing in a number of countries. The firm that can decompose pro-
duction across borders maximises global profits. Global profits are the sum of revenues 
across locations of production minus production costs. The firm chooses a vertical de-
composition of production to optimise over relative wages leading to complementarity 
in labour demands between locations. Thus, the location of production stages depends 
on relative wages if trade barriers are not prohibitive. Assembly is produced in the low-
wage location if there is intra-firm trade. In a simple two-country case, the parent’s la-
bour demand  i L  can be expressed as  
 
(1)  j j i i j j i i i i Y Y w w L γ γ β β α + + + + =                                             
 
The multinational’s reduced form labour demand for a given affiliate location j is the 
weighted sum of labour costs w and demand conditions Y across locations.
6 The focus 
of our empirical analysis is to estimate the cross-elasticity of labour demand j β . If pro-
duction is vertically decomposed then the parent’s labour demand will be decreasing in 
                                                           
6  For the model, see Riker and Brainard (1997). 
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 the wage in its location, 0 < i β , decreasing in the wage of its affiliate location  0 < j β , 
increasing in local demand 0 > j γ , and  increasing in foreign demand  0 > j γ . On the 
other hand, if production is not vertically decomposed, then 0 ≥ j β . With 0 < j β , multi-
nationals are linked internationally at the firm level through trade in intermediate and 
final goods.  As a result of those trade links affiliate jobs are complements rather than 
substitutes for parent firm jobs.  
 
We estimate a log-linear version of the parent’s labour demand equation (1) using ordi-
nary least squares based on our firm survey data of 2,200 investment projects in eastern 
Europe by 660 firms in Austria and Germany.  The data are at the firm-level and are a 
cross section for the years 1997-2000 in Germany and for the years 1999-2000 in Aus-
tria, covering the production activity of German and Austrian affiliates in all countries 
of eastern Europe including the former Soviet Union. Equation 1 includes industry 
dummies to account for firm heterogeneity as well as time dummies for the years 1997-
2000 in Germany and for the years 1999-2000 in Austria to control for time fixed ef-
fects
7. Due to data problems we will not distinguish between workers by skill level, be-
cause we do not observe wages for skills at the firm level. Wages w are average euro-
denominated compensations per employee and Y  are sales of parent firms in Austria 
and Germany and their affiliates in eastern Europe. The independent variable parent 
employment  i L  is number of workers of parent firms in Austria and Germany, respec-
tively. 
 
We estimate the model of multinational labour demand separately for affiliates in CEE, 
SEE and the CIS allowing the slope terms β  and γ  to vary across these regions. 
 
 
                                                           
7  We are not too worried about the potential problem of endogeneity of the independent variables firm 
wages and firm output, since the time dimension of the data set is limited. The data cover the period 
1990 to 2001, but the actual figures are for the years 1997 to 2000 for Germany and 1999 to 2000 for 
Austria. A possible problem of endogeneity may arise when wages in eastern Europe affiliates in-
crease and wages of parent firms decline due to firms relocation of production towards eastern Eu-
rope.     
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 CEE SEE CIS CEE SEE CIS
dependent variable: log parent employment
log parent output  0.88* 0.95* 1.11* 0.96* 0.97* 1.09*
(31.08) (14.72) (11.12) (35.33) (7.48) (26.03)
log parent wage  -0.86* -0.86* -2.20* -0.48* -0.76* -0.38
(7.80) (2.72) (4.91) (7.21) (2.23) (1.42)
log affiliate output  -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07* -0.13 0.00
(1.46) (0.70) (1.45) (2.17) (0.97) (0.07)
log affiliate wage  -0.16* -0.04 0.08 -0.16* 0.14 -0.12
(2.77) (0.43) (0.67) (3.34) (0.73) (1.83)
constant 1.51 -1.47 10.47* -4.33* -2.37 -9.21*
(1.14) (0.42) (2.31) (4.90) (0.52) (3.53)
corr. R
2 0.786 0.829 0.921 0.844 0.825 0.949
number of oberservations 401 90 35 311 38 62
t-values are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 5% percent level
Table 5.     Parent Labour Demand Equation
Austria Germany
Note: Estimates are for a cross section of parent firms and their affiliates in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern Eastern 
Europe (SEE) and the former Soviet Union (CIS) of the years 1997-2000 in Germany and 1999-2000 in Austria. Estimation is 
based on equation (1) and are OLS estimates including industry fixed effects and time dummies for the years 1997-2000 for 
Germany and 1999-2000 for Austria. 
 
 
 
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 5. Table 5 gives Austrian 
and German parent companies’ labour demand, respectively for the CEE countries, the 
candidate countries of the second round SEE, and the CIS countries . The estimated 
employment demand functions show that a 10 percent decline in affiliate wages in CEE 
countries leads to a 1.6 percent increase rather than decline in the parent company’s 
employment demand in both Austria and Germany, respectively. These estimates sug-
gest that the outsourcing activity of German and Austrian firms to eastern European 
14 
 countries has actually helped to create jobs in Austria and Germany, respectively. Out-
sourcing some of the firm’s activities to their CEE affiliates has helped Austrian and 
German firms to save 65-80 percent of their labour costs (see Figure 1), helping these 
firms to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. Rather than com-
peting with each other as alternative suppliers of the same final goods, affiliates in the 
CEE countries complement each other by supplying different components of the same 
final good.  
 
The picture looks different for the SEE countries. In the SEE countries, affiliates’ wages 
appear not to play any role for the parent firms’ labour demand in Austria and Germany, 
respectively. At first, this seems surprising, given the relative low wages in these coun-
tries. A look at Figure 1 offers, however, an answer. German and Austrian affiliates in 
these countries are not able to increase their productivity levels much beyond that of the 
country as a whole when producing locally. Therefore, outsourcing to the SEE countries 
does not offer the prospect of lowering German and Austrian firms’ overall production 
costs as much as in the CEE countries. As an outsourcing location, the SEE countries 
appear to be less attractive.  
 
The picture looks different again for the CIS countries. Austria’s and Germany’s multi-
nationals appear to follow a diverse strategy in these markets. German multinationals 
use the CIS countries to lower their overall production costs. A decline in CIS affiliate 
wages increases the German parent’s labour demand. The relationship is significant at 
the 10 percent level. Austrian multinationals, however, appear to substitute cheap labour 
in the CIS for expensive labour in Austria. However, the relationship is not significant 
at conventional levels. 
   
In sum, job losses because of Austrian and German investment in eastern Europe appear 
low for two reasons. First, in Austria, horizontal investment driven by market-seeking 
considerations dominates among investment in eastern Europe. Second, among vertical 
investment driven by differences in factor prices, affiliate jobs in eastern Europe appear 
not to compete with jobs in Austria and Germany. Austrian and German firms increase 
their production and employment demand in Austria and Germany when workers in 
their affiliates in the CEE countries become less costly. Lower costs of eastern Euro-
pean affiliates help firms to lower overall productions costs and to stay competitive. 
This appears to be the reason why job losses because of Austrian and German invest-
ment in eastern Europe are so strikingly low
8. 
 
                                                           
8  Riker and Brainard (1997), Brainard and Riker (1997) get very similar results for US multinational 
firms’ investment strategy in face of  NAFTA; see also Braconnier and Eckholm (2000) for Swedish 
multinationals in eastern Europe. 
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 6.  A human capital crisis? 
 
In recent months a new concern has been raised by economic experts in Germany. Ger-
man firms are now outsourcing their head office activities to eastern Europe. Germany 
is now losing the ‘good jobs’, the high-skilled, R&D and IT jobs, not just low-skilled 
jobs. Siemens, for example, announced in an interview with the Financial Times Deut-
schland that it plans to outsource  one-third of its R&D activity to subsidiaries located 
in low-wage countries such as China, India and Russia. It also plans to centralise and 
outsource some of its head office activities, such as accounting and personnel manage-
ment, to Siemens subsidiaries in the Czech Republic. Siemens praised the high quality 
of skilled workers in eastern Europe. Armin Sorg, the Siemens chief economist, argued 
at a conference on the ‘Economic consequences of eastern Enlargement’, hosted by the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, that east Europe is a particularly attractive location for Sie-
mens compared to China and India, because of its proximity to Germany and because of 
the same culture and timezone
9. Similarly, Bank Austria has started to outsource ma-
thematical software development and other head office functions to Russia. Are these 
corporate inversions of firm activities taking place only at Siemens and Bank Austria or 
are they a  general trend among Austrian and German multinational firms?
10 
 
 
                                                           
9 See  Financial Times Deutschland , 12 December 2003, and Sorg, Armin (2001) Erwartungen und 
Erfahrungen eines Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen 
einer EU-Osterweiterung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn. 
10  The trend of corporate inversions has been observed in the US as well where US firms outsource IT 
jobs and other headquarter activity to India and partly China, see The Economist, January 2004.   
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 We can provide an answer to this question by looking at the number of skilled jobs Aus-
trian and German firms are creating in their affiliates in eastern Europe. How skill-
intensive is the activity undertaken by Austrian and German affiliates in eastern Europe, 
compared to their parent activity in Austria and Germany? Table 6 gives the relevant 
numbers for Germany. 
 
I use two indicators to measure the skill intensity of German affiliates in eastern Eu-
rope: the share of workers with a university or college degree, and the share of person-
nel engaged in R&D or engineering activities in the manufacturing and service sector. 
The data suggest that the high skill ratios of affiliates (the number of university or col-
lege workers in percent of total affiliate workers) are  two to three times as large as that 
of German parent firms in all three regions: CEE, SEE, and CIS. The share of university 
or college graduates among affiliate workers in eastern Europe varies between 86 per-
cent (Czech Republic) and eight percent (Slovenia). The most skill-intensive activity is 
undertaken by affiliates in the Czech Republic (skill share of 86 percent), in Russia 
(skill share of 63 percent), and in Croatia and Slovakia (skill share of 40 percent). This 
compares with an average share of university or college graduates of German parent 
firms of 18 percent only. Thus, measured by the number of university and college gra-
duates, German affiliates in Bulgaria are 12 times as skill intensive as their German par-
ent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic 5.5 times as skill-intensive, and affiliates in 
Russia are 2.9 times as skill intensive. Only affiliates in Hungary have a skill share be-
low that of German parent firms.  
 
A similar picture emerges when the skill intensity of German affiliates is measured by 
the share of workers engaged in R&D and engineering (see Table 6). The R&D person-
nel ratios of affiliates in eastern Europe range between 4.0 percent (Slovakia) and 27.8 
percent (Croatia and Russia). This compares with an average R&D personnel share of 
13.6 percent in German parent firms. Thus, German affiliates in Russia are 2.9 times as 
R&D intensive as their German parent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic and Croa-
tia 1.7 times as R&D intensive, and affiliates in Ukraine 1.4 as research intensive. The 
remaining countries affiliates’ R&D intensity is below that of German parent firms.  
 
In Table 6, I look at Austria’s export of high-skilled jobs to eastern Europe. It appears 
from the table that the share of university and college graduate workers as a percentage 
of Austrian affiliates’ workers in eastern Europe, ranges from 9.6 percent (Romania) to 
34.8 percent (Russia), compared to a skill share of 14.7 percent in Austrian parent firms. 
Thus, only affiliates in Slovenia have a smaller employment share of university and col-
lege graduates compared to Austrian parent firms. Affiliates in Bulgaria employ 26 
times as many university graduates compared to the Austrian parent company, affiliates 
in Ukraine 19 times, and affiliates in Russia and Romania 3.7 times. Although the R&D 
ratios of Austrian affiliates are extremely high and much larger than those of German 
affiliates in eastern Europe (they range between 3.8 percent in affiliates in the Baltic 
states to 45.8 percent in affiliates in Russia, given in Table 6), none of the Austrian af-
filiates’ research and engineering activities in eastern Europe exceed that of their Aus-
trian parent firms with the exception of those in Russia. The reason for this is the ex-
tremely high R&D intensity of parent firms in Austria. The high R&D intensity of par-
ent firms in Austria appears large indeed since in this respect, Austrian firms outper-
form German parent firms. This is quite striking. 
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One possible reason for this result is economic policy. The Austrian government gives 
major tax incentives and subsidies to R&D activity, which might have encouraged firms  
move more into this activity in Austria and to locate less of this activity in eastern Eu-
rope
11. One indication that the large R&D ratios of parent firms in Austria are induced 
by policy is the diverse pattern of the skill personnel ratios and the R&D ratios of Aus-
trian affiliates in eastern Europe. Typically, when the government subsidises R&D, the 
R&D sector expands and competes with other sectors for skilled workers. However, 
when firms have the option to outsource to eastern Europe some of the activities that 
use skilled workers but that do not qualify for a domestic R&D subsidy (such as high-
tech activity in other sectors), they can avoid competing for talent in the local labour 
market
12. 
 
Take the examples of Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine as outsourcing locations. Austrian 
affiliates in Bulgaria and Ukraine employ 19-26 times as many skilled workers in pro-
duction as their parent firms in Austria, but only 0-14-0.27 times as many skilled work-
ers in research and engineering. A similar but less striking picture emerges in Russia. 
Austrian affiliates in Russia use 3.7 times as many skilled workers in production and the 
same amount of skilled workers in R&D activity as Austrian parent firms. German affil-
iates in Russia use about the same skill intensity in production, and also in research (see 
Table 6). In sum, affiliate activities of Austrian multinationals in eastern Europe appear 
to be more skill-intensive in terms of their share of university and college workers, but 
less skill-intensive in terms of their R&D intensity, although the R&D ratios of Austrian 
affiliates in some of the eastern European countries turn out to be extremely large. 
 
These are striking and puzzling numbers. Austrian and German multinationals tend to 
outsource the most skill- and R&D-intensive activities to eastern Europe. Why is this 
happening? Economic theory guides us to look at the factor endowment of these coun-
tries for an answer. If countries outsource the most skill intensive activities to other 
countries, then these countries must be poorly endowed with skills relative to their trad-
ing partners
13. Table 7 documents Austria’s and Germany’s endowment of skills com-
pared to eastern Europe. It appears from the table that the Baltic states, Russia, Hun-
gary, and Bulgaria are the most skill-rich countries as measured by the share of the la-
bour force with tertiary-level education. Germany’s education level lies below the 
OECD average and roughly matches that of the CEE countries' average. In particular, 
Germany is less skill rich than the Baltic states, Russia and Hungary. In this ranking of 
countries, Austria turns out to be one of the least skill-rich countries
14. 
 
                                                           
11  Moreover, Austria has one of highest share of state financed R&D, see Marin (1995).  
12  For Austria’s R&D and technology policy and its effects see Marin (1995).  
13  For a theory of multinational investment based on factor endowment differences between countries, 
see Helpman (1984). 
14  These numbers do not say much about the quality of education in these countries. The numbers are 
quantitative measures of formal education only.   
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 1998 2007 1998 2007
OECD high income countries
3), average 0.16 0.26 0.77 0.74
      Austria 0.07 0.18 0.91 0.82
      Germany 0.15 0.24 0.76 0.76
      France 0.24 0.29 0.76 0.71
      Sweden 0.13 0.30 0.72 0.69
      Finland 0.12 0.35 0.78 0.65
      Netherlands 0.26 0.32
4) 0.74 0.68
      United Kingdom 0.15 0.32 0.75 0.67
      Italy 0.10 0.16 0.90 0.84
      Norway 0.17 0.33 0.69 0.67
      Japan 0.19 0.40 0.71 0.60
CEE
5), average 0.14 0.23 0.74 0.77
      Baltic States 0.20 0.30 0.59 0.70
      Czech Republic 0.11 0.14 0.89 0.86
      Hungary 0.15 0.21 0.84 0.79
      Poland 0.11 0.22 0.85 0.78
      Slovakia 0.11 0.15 0.57 0.85
      Slovenia 0.07 0.22 0.86 0.78
SEE
6), average 0.10 0.19 0.84 0.81
      Bulgaria 0.12 0.24 0.82 0.76
      Romania 0.08 0.13 0.88 0.87
      Croatia 0.10 0.18 0.83 0.82
Russia
7) 0.18 0.53 0.49 0.47
Source: International Labor Organization
1) tertiary education (third level, first stage, leading to a first university degree or equivalent qualification + third level, 
 second stage, leading to a post-graduate university degree)
2) no schooling + first level + second level, first stage + second level, second stage
3) Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway
4) 2008
5) Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia
6) Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania
7) In 2007 polytechnique schools have been included into tertiary education, while not being included before.
Table 7. Skill Endowment of Selected Countries
education levels in percent of the labour force 
high skill
1) low skill
2)
 
 
What has happened to Austria and Germany – two countries  known as ‘nations of poets 
and thinkers’ – that they rank so low among the rich OECD countries? To understand 
why Austria and Germany fare so poorly in an international comparison of skill en-
dowment levels, we have to turn to history on the one hand, and to the accumulation of 
skills in the post-war period on the other. 
 
I have estimated in Marin (1995) that the second world war and the mass killing of Jews 
in the Holocaust destroyed 30 percent of Austria’s human capital stock. A less conserv-
ative estimate by Stadler (1987), which includes the Jewish population that was not part 
of Jewish communities, and the skilled non-Jewish population that went into exile, puts 
20 
 the loss of Austria’s human capital stock at 67 percent. Most efforts in Austria in the 
post-war period went into rebuilding physical capital stock destroyed in the war. But 
Austria never recovered from the destruction of its human capital stock: the accumula-
tion of skills in the post-war period has not been able to make up for it
15. 
 
In Table 8, I look at the accumulation of skills in the post-war period in Austria and 
Germany. Table 8 reports the annual growth rates of the human capital stock per person 
in the two countries for the period 1960-1997. This measure of human capital is ob-
tained by aggregating five education levels using the market wage of each education 
level as a weight. The market wage of each education level, in turn, is estimated by a 
Mincer type wage equation which relates years of schooling to the hourly wage rate
16. 
The table shows that human capital accumulation dramatically slowed in the 1990s in 
both countries. In Germany, the annual growth rate of the human capital stock per per-
son declined from 0.75 percent in the 1980s to 0.18 percent in the 1990s. This is a slow-
ing down of the annual growth rate of more than  two-thirds. In Austria, the annual 
growth rate of the skilled stock more than halved between the 1980s and 1990s from 
0.37 percent to 0.15 percent. Thus, in the 1990s when trade integration with the former 
communist countries and the revolution in information technology put pressure on the 
demand for skilled labour, the supply of skilled labour almost came to a halt in both 
countries. This has generated a dramatic scarcity of human capital in both countries. 
 
 
Austria Germany
1960-1980 0.45 0.85
1980-1990 0.37 0.75
1990-1997 0.15 0.18
1960-1997 0.37 0.69
Source: Koman and Marin (2000)
annual growth rates in percent
Table 8.  Human Capital Stock per Person
 
 
                                                           
15   I am not aware of a similar estimate for Germany.  
16   For details on the estimation procedure see Koman and Marin (2000). 
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 7.  A reverse pattern of ‘maquiladoras’ in Austria and Germany?  
 
These numbers suggest that the source of the problem is the relative scarcity of human 
capital in Austria and Germany. Austrian and German firms move the most skill-
intensive activities to eastern Europe because they cannot find the skilled workers in 
their labour markets. 
 
This move toeastern Europe may explain why the wage gap between skilled and un-
skilled workers remained constant during the 1990s in Germany  despite the informa-
tion revolution and trade integration with eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 2 gives the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the 1990s in Austria and Ger-
many on the one hand and in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland on the other. We 
use as a proxy for the skill-wage ratio relative wages of non-production to production 
workers. The data show a strong increase in the relative wage for skills in Poland and 
the other accession countries during the 1990s, while this ratio remained constant in 
Germany and declined somewhat in Austria. These data do not show a pattern of factor 
prices that trade economists usually expect from trade and investment integration. Take 
the example of Germany and Poland. Typically, when a skill-rich country such as Ger-
many (relative to Poland) integrates with a skill-poor country such as Poland (see Table 
7), we expect relative wages for skills to go up in Germany and to decline in Poland. 
The reason is that trade integration leads a country to specialise in those sectors that use 
the country’s abundant factor intensively. Thus, skill-rich Germany specialises in the 
skill-intensive sectors and labour-rich Poland specialises in labour-intensive sectors. As 
a result the relative demand for skills goes up in Germany and declines in Poland, lead-
ing to an increase in the relative wage for skills in Germany and to a decline of those in 
Poland. By the same argument, in skill-poor Austria relative wages for skills are ex-
pected to decline with trade integration with eastern Europe. 
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Why have relative wages for skilled workers increased in eastern Europe and remained 
constant in Austria and Germany? Why do we observe a perverse Stolper-Samuelson 
effect in these countries? Economic experts have explained the constant nature of the 
wage gap in Austria and Germany in the 1990s by labour-market rigidities. Labour-
market rigidities may explain why low-skilled wages have not declined. But the puzzle 
remains. Why have skilled wages not increased in Germany and why have they not de-
clined in Austria as a consequence of trade integration with eastern Europe?
17 Let us 
first focus on Germany. Two easy answers for the unchanging wage gap in Germany 
may be obtained from Tables 1, 2 and 7. First, Table 1 and 2 show that the trade and 
investment shares with eastern Europe are too small to have an impact on wage inequa-
lity in Germany
18. But if this is the answer, why then have trade and investment integra-
tion with eastern Europe not influenced wage inequality in Austria, where these shares 
are much larger? Second, Table 7 shows that Germany’s endowment with skills more or 
less matches the CEE countries’ average. Thus, relative factor prices may not have 
changed in Germany, because Germany’s trade integration with the CEE countries is an 
integration of countries with similar factor endowments. But if this is the right answer, 
why then have relative wages for skills in the CEE countries not remained more-or-less 
the same as well?
19 Something else must be at work here. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) have argued in the context of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that this perverse Stolper-Samuelson effect can be ex-
plained by capital movements in the form of foreign direct investment from the US to 
Mexico. US multinationals started to outsource the more labour intensive stages of pro-
duction to Mexico. The so-called 'maquiladoras' then emerged in Mexico. Maquiladoras 
are affiliates of US multinationals in Mexico that specialise in the low skill intensive 
part of the value chain. In their model, a single manufactured good is produced from a 
continuum of intermediate inputs, which are in turn produced using skilled workers, un-
skilled workers, and capital. Assuming that trade does not lead to factor price equalisa-
tion, the equilibrium is described by the labour-rich South (Mexico) producing and ex-
porting a range of inputs up to some critical ratio of skilled to unskilled labour, with the 
skill-rich North (US) producing the remainder of the inputs. The northern inputs include 
such activities as R&D and marketing, which use little or no unskilled labour, while the 
activities that are more intensive in unskilled labour are outsourced to the South. In this 
model, US multinationals’ outsourcing activities to Mexico lead relative wages for 
skills to increase in the US as well as in Mexico. The reason is that the outsourced activ-
ity from the US to Mexico is less skilled-labour intensive than what the US is now pro-
ducing, but more skilled-labour intensive than what Mexico used to produce. As a re-
sult, relative demand for skilled labour increases in both countries.  
 
The data I have just presented, however, suggest that with eastern enlargement a ‘re-
verse maquiladoras’ effect is in the process of emerging in Austria and Germany. Aus-
trian and German multinationals outsource the more skill-intensive stages of production 
 
17  Fersterer and Winter-Ebner (2003) actually find a slight decline in the return rates on education in 
Austria.  
18  See Krugman (1994) who argues that the trade shares with low wage countries in the US are much 
too small to explain the increase in wage inequality in the US. 
19  One could argue that the CEE countries’ transformation from a planned to a market economy has 
actually contributed to the increase in the wage gap in these countries. Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold 
(2008) finds weak support for this for Poland.   
to eastern Europe (see Table 6
20) and specialise in the more labour-intensive stages of 
production in Austria and Germany, respectively. Thus, firms in Austria and Germany 
are in the process of becoming the maquiladoras of Austrian and German affiliates in 
eastern Europe with a reversal of roles between head office and affiliate activities. The 
activities transferred by Austrian and German multinationals to eastern Europe are more 
skill intensive than those now produced in Austria and Germany. As a result, the rela-
tive demand for skilled labour declines in Austria and Germany. This way, firms’ out-
sourcing of high skill-intensive activities toeeastern Europe has helped ease the human 
capital crisis in Germany and Austria. This may explain why relative wages for skills in 
Germany have not increased with the revolution in information technology in the 1990s, 
because firms’ outsourcing activities have removed some of the demand pressure on 
skills from the German labour market. Whether relative wages for skills increase or de-
cline ineastern Europe depends on whether or not the outsourcing activities transferred 
to eastern Europe are more or less skill intensive than the activities formerly carried out 
in eastern Europe. The increases in relative wages for skills in eastern Europe suggest 
that the activities transferred from Austria and Germany, respectively, are more skill 
intensive than those formerly carried out in eastern Europe
21. 
 
In order to see if a ‘reverse maquiladoras’ effect is indeed at work in Austria and Ger-
many, we run the Feenstra and Hanson regressions for Austria, Germany, and Poland to 
examine the importance of outsourcing for relative wages for skilled workers in these 
three countries. We examine if annual changes in non-production workers’ wages rela-
tive to production workers' wages as a proxy for relative wages for skilled workers, is 
negatively correlated with annual changes in outsourcing and other control variables 
(which are suppressed) in Austria and Germany, and positively correlated in Poland. 
We indeed find this
22. In the period 1991-2003, the annual growth rate of outsourcing as 
measured by the share of imported inputs in percent of value added increased by 2.5 
percent in Germany and by 5.8 percent in Austria (1995-2002) and in Poland by 6.9 
percent (1994-2002), as measured by the ratio of foreign to domestic assets. As can be 
seen from Figure 3, during the same period the annual growth rates of relative wages 
between skilled and unskilled workers were 0.21 percent in Germany, -0.29 percent in 
Austria, and 4.4 percent in Poland. Figure 3 gives the contribution of outsourcing to the 
                                                           
20  Austrian multinationals in particular to skill rich Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, the Czech Re-
public and Poland; German multinationals in particular to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia, and 
the Slovak Republic. 
21  In the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) model it is assumed that the US is the skill rich country and Mex-
ico the labour rich country with US firms outsourcing of the labour intensive stages of production to 
Mexico leading to an increase in relative wages for skills in both countries.  Applying this model to 
Germany and eastern Europe with Germany as the skill poor country and eastern Europe as the skill 
rich country leads to the prediction that German outsourcing to  eastern Europe leads to a decline in 
relative wages for skills in both countries. To reconcile the model with the fact that relative wages for 
skills increased in eastern Europe one has to assume exogenous differences in technology between 
the two countries and/or that the activity transferred is more skill intensive than the rest of the reci-
pient economy, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for the stability conditions and relative wages. This 
paper does not attempt to explain the evolution of the wag gap in eastern Europe. To do so requires 
more careful analyses of each particular CEE country.  For example, Poland’s stark increase in the 
relative wage for skills appears to be induced by outsourcing investments from skill rich countries 
like France, the US and the Netherlands rather than Germany.  
22  For more details on the empirical results for Austria and Poland see Lorentowitcz, Marin, Raubold 
(2008) and for Germany see Marin and Raubold (2006). 
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annual changes in relative wages of skilled workers based on the Feenstra and Hanson 
regressions for these three countries. Outsourcing contributes 41 percent in Germany, 
36 percent in Austria, and 16 percent in Poland to the change in relative wages for 
skilled workers in these countries. In other words, in the absence of outsourcing, rela-
tive wages for skilled workers would have increased by 41 percent more in Germany 
(instead of increasing by 0.21 annually it would have increased by 0.30 percent annual-
ly), and relative wages for skilled workers would have declined by 36 percent less in 
Austria (instead of declining by 0.29 percent annually it would have declined by 0.18 
percent annually). In Poland the relative wage would have increased by 3.7 percent ra-
ther than by 4.4 percent, in the absence of outsourcing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing: Poland: 1+(foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets), manufacturing, Austria and Germany: 
(imported inputs from own sector/value added of sector)*100, mining and manufacturing
Relative wages: non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, and mining and 
manufacturing for Austria 
Poland: 23 two-digit NACE industries, 1994-2002; Germany: 19 two-digit NACE industries, 1991-2003, 
Austria: 15 two-digit NACE industries, 1995-2002, other controls are suppressed.
Source: Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2008), Marin and Raubold (2006)
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Figure 3. Contribution of Outsourcing and Offshoring to Relative Wages between 
Skilled and Unskilled Workers
Outsourcing: Poland: 1+(foreign fixed assets/domestic fixed assets), manufacturing, Austria and Germany: 
(imported inputs from own sector/value added of sector)*100, mining and manufacturing
Relative wages: non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, and mining and 
manufacturing for Austria 
Poland: 23 two-digit NACE industries, 1994-2002; Germany: 19 two-digit NACE industries, 1991-2003, 
Austria: 15 two-digit NACE industries, 1995-2002, other controls are suppressed.
Source: Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2008), Marin and Raubold (2006)
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8. What can be done? 
 
Can an R&D subsidy prevent the exodus of skilled jobs? 
 
The governments of Austria and Germany might be tempted to address the problem of 
firms’ outsourcing of head office activity by subsidising skill-intensive activities in 
Austria and Germany. On December 19, 2003, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared 
to the media that his government would meet the challenge of the loss of high-skilled 
jobs as a result of outsourcing to low-wage countries by creating high skill jobs in Ger-
many. The German labour union IG Metall asked to make subsidies and public pro-
curement projects contingent on local production. Do these policies make sense? Are 
they desirable for the economy as whole? 
23 
 
A subsidy on high skill-intensive activity might make things worse when a country is 
faced with a human-capital scarcity. By increasing the profitability of R&D activity, 
firms will increase their demand for high skilled labour, exacerbating the scarcity of 
human capital. When the human-capital constraint binds, the subsidy will result in a rel-
ative increase in skilled wages leading to a decline in manufacturing activity. The rea-
son is that the subsidy induces the R&D sector to compete with the manufacturing sec-
tor for scarce skilled workers thus pushing up the wages for skills. The expansion of the 
R&D sector then crowds out the activity of the manufacturing sector. As a result, the 
manufacturing sector contracts and the country ends up with higher relative wages for 
skilled workers than before the R&D subsidy was introduced. This unexpected result of 
a R&D subsidy is generated by the economy wide scarcity of human capital
24. 
 
Liberalise the movement of skilled workers with eastern enlargement 
 
If an R&D subsidy cannot help what actually can help? If the governments of Austria 
and Germany care about where these skill-intensive head office activities take place 
(and it might make sense to care about it), they need to find a way to relax the constraint 
on human capital in the economy. There are two non-exclusive ways to do this: to let 
skills come in from other countries (immigration), and/or to produce more skills (educa-
tion policy). As I have shown in this paper, human capital accumulation dramatically 
slowed in the 1990s, in particular in Germany. Therefore, it is important to create an 
environment in which people find it attractive to invest in human capital. This requires 
letting relative returns to education increase by introducing more flexible labour mar-
kets in which relative wages for skills can adjust to changes in market conditions. The 
PISA study documented that Germany has a problem not only in the quantity of edu-
                                                           
23 See  Süddeutsche Zeitung 3 September 2003.  To get a sense of the crisis felt in Germany consider the 
new proposal discussed in the Social Democratic Party Schroeder’s government. On 5 January 2004 
Schroeder declared that he wants to meet the challenges ahead by creating 10 Ivy League universities 
like Harvard and Stanford in Germany. This sounds like revolution for a party with an egalitarian tra-
dition typically opposed to any elitist ideas in particular in education. But the party still opposes tui-
tion fees for students when Tony Blair’s Labour government is introducing just that in British univer-
sities.  
24  For this counterintuitive effect of a R&D subsidy see Grossman and Helpman (1991). This effect of a 
R&D subsidy will be particularly prevalent in small countries with a small number of skilled work-
ers. An example is Austria. The Austrian government pursued an active R&D policy in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s with the described unintended results, see Marin (1995). 
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cated people it produces, but also in the quality of education.  Education policy is now 
one of the central policy issues of the German government and rightly so. Focusing on 
the quantity of human capital produced, Koman and Marin (2000) show that the decline 
in the growth rate of human capital in the 1990s came with the costs of 0.5 and 0.3 per-
centage points less growth annually in Germany and Austria, respectively. These esti-
mates calculate the direct growth effects of human capital but do not take into account 
potential spillovers to the rest of the economy. If the scarcity of human capital leads 
corporations to outsource head office and R&D activities to other countries, and these 
activities generate spillovers to the rest of the economy, then the scarcity of human capi-
tal may come with growth losses of much larger size than those obtained from a direct 
growth accounting calculation
25 
26. It is important to note, however, that firms’ out-
sourcing to eastern Europe leads – like any form of economic integration – to an in-
crease in welfare in both Austria and Germany on the one hand and eastern Europe on 
the other
27. 
 
But education policy will need time to change the skill endowment of a country. Immi-
gration is definitely quicker for dealing with a human capital crisis. In Germany, the 
Green Card for IT jobs is the first attempt to bring skills into the country. The German 
government is now discussing a new immigration law that will govern immigration un-
der European enlargement. Liberalising the movement of high-skilled labour with east-
ern enlargement would be desirable under these circumstances. The import of skilled 
workers from eastern Europe would reduce relative wages for skilled workers (assum-
ing labour markets are allowed to adjust), and with it the cost of innovation in Germany. 
This will make it attractive for firms to undertake these knowledge-intensive activities 
in Germany rather than in eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
25  Indirect evidence that the outsourcing activities of German multinationals are producing such spillov-
ers to the rest of the economy is Protsenko (2003). He estimates with the same firm survey data 
whether vertical and horizontal FDI differ with respect to their spillover effects in the Czech Repub-
lic. He finds that German vertical FDI in the Czech Republic has positive effects on the productivity 
of local firms, while horizontal FDI does not have such effects. This stands in contrast with previous 
studies on FDI in the Czech Republic which typically find negative productivity effects of total FDI, 
not distinguishing between vertical and horizontal FDI. These positive spillovers from vertical FDI 
on a host country casts doubts on the previously held notion that offshore production is a ‘bad’ thing 
for an country receiving FDI. What appears to matter here is what kind of firm activity is outsourced 
to the host country.  
26  Coe and Helpman (1995) estimate international R&D spillovers and they find that it does matter eco-
nomically where the R&D activity takes place. 
27  For the difference between welfare and growth in a global economy, see Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), for the welfare effects of outsourcing, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
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